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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COMMITMENT OF THE
MENTALLY 'ILL IN MARYLANIt
By HowARD S. CHASANOW*
INTRODUCTION
The problem of hospitalization of the mentally ill is
one that is ever growing in scope, and because of its magni-
tude, should be of vital interest to doctors and lawyers as
well as the general public. Today, one-half of all hospital
beds in the nation are occupied by mental patients, and it
is estimated that one out of twelve persons will spend some
portion of his life in a mental institution. The direct cost
of mental illness to taxpayers is over a billion dollars a
year.'
In colonial times only the "furiously mad" or violently
and dangerously insane could be confined. Since there were
no hospitals for the mentally ill, they were treated as
criminals or paupers and incarcerated in jails, poorhouses,
private cages or strong-rooms.
The first general hospital in the United States, The
Pennsylvania Hospital, was established in 1756. This hos-
pital received mental patients as well as those who were
physcially ill. The first hospital exclusively for mental
patients was opened in 1773 in Williamsburg, Virginia.2
These early hospitals cared for the mentally ill in a
deplorable manner; accepted procedures were whipping,
t This article is based on a paper originally prepared for the Seminar
on Medico-Legal Problems at the University of Maryland School of Law
under the supervision of Professor L. Whiting Farinholt, Jr.
The author wishes to thank the members of the Department of Mental
Hygiene, the several physicians interviewed, and particularly Mr. William
Martin whose guidance made this paper possible. After this article was
written and prepared for publication, the American Bar Foundation's
Report on the Rights of the Mentally Ill, was published by the University
of Chicago Press; LINDMAN & MCINTYRE (EDs.), THE MENTALLY DISALED
AND THE LAW (1961). See Book Review, infra p. 375.
* Of the Maryland Bar; A.B. 1959, LL.B. 1961, University of Maryland.
'Hearings on H.R. 3458, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
2 Weihofen and Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 24 Texas
L. Rev. 307, 310 (1946).
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chaining patients to the wall and "mad-shirts." No effort
was made to discover and treat the disorder, the purpose
of the institution being to guard the inmates and prevent
their escape.
Improvement of the conditions in institutions came
largely through the efforts of a few reformers such as
Dorothy Lynde Dix in the 1840's, and Mrs. E. W. P.
Packard, the latter writing several expos6s in 1860 after
spending three years in the State Insane Asylum at Jack-
son, Illinois.'
8At present there are six mental hospitals in Maryland which treat
80% of the state's mental patients. They are as follows:
Rosewood State Training School, located at Owings Mills, Maryland.
This institution was incorporated under the name of "Visitors of the
Asylum and Training School for the Feeble Minded of the State of Mary-
land" by Md. Laws 1888, ch. 183. It received its present name by Md.
Laws 1912, ch. 187. Rosewood receives all mentally deficient and epileptic
children from Baltimore City and the twenty-three counties of the State.
Crownsville State Hospital, located at Crownsville, Maryland. This
institution was established under the name of "Hospital for the Negro
Insane of Maryland" by Art. 58A, Md. Laws 1910, ch. 250 receiving its
present name by Md. Laws 1912, ch. 187. Crownsville receives Negro
patients from Baltimore City and the twenty three counties of the State,
including the tubercular and the epileptic.
Eastern Shore State Hospital, located at Cambridge, Maryland. This
institution was established by Md. Laws 1912, ch. 187 under its present
name. The hospital receives white patients, except the tubercular and
epileptic, from the nine counties on the Eastern Shore.
Springfield State Hospital, located at Sykesville, Maryland. This in-
stitution was established by Md. Laws 1894, ch. 231 under the name of the
"Second Hospital for the Insane of the State of Maryland," and received
its present name by Md. Laws 1900, ch. 70. Springfield receives mental
patients from the following counties: Allegany, Baltimore County, east of
York Road, Carroll, Frederick, Garrett, Howard, Montgomery, Washington
and from Baltimore City- zones 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 24, and 31.
In addition Springfield admits all white tubercular and adult epileptic
patients from Baltimore City and the twenty three counties. These patients
are cared for in separate divisions of the hospital.
Spring Grove State Hospital, located at Catonsville, Maryland. This
institution was established by Md. Laws 1797, ch. 102 and received its
present name by Md. Laws 1912, ch. 187. Spring Grove receives Its
patients from the following counties: Anne Arundel, Baltimore County -
west of York Road, Calvert, Charles, Harford, Prince George's, St. Mary's
and Baltimore City - zones 7, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, 23, 25, 26, 29, and 30.
Maximum Security Hospital, located at Jessup, Maryland. This institu-
tion was established under its present name by Md. Laws 1959, ch. 814.
It admits male mental patients, both Negro and white, requiring maximum
security hospitalization as well as male mentally ill prisoners transferred
from penal institutions, and male defendants committed by the criminal
courts.
In addition to the state mental hospitals, people suffering from mental
disorders are also treated at the Veteran's Administration Hospital at
Perry Point, the several private psychiatric hospitals and the general
hospitals which accept patients for psychiatric treatment. Patuxent
Institution for defective delinquents (See 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 318.)
presents a specialized problem of classification and commitment and is
outside the scope of this article.
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CML COMMITMENTS
4
Today in Maryland there are three main procedures,'
unconnected with criminal proceedings, under which a
person may be admitted to a mental hospital. Although
these will be analyzed in detail later in the article, briefly
they are as follows: commitment by County Commissioners
on certification of two qualified physicians;6 commitment
at the request of a member of the "insane's" family, rela-
tive, friend, etc., accompanied by two doctors' certificates;'
and voluntary admission.'
An analysis of any commitment procedure will show
two often conflicting factors exerting varying degrees of
influence. The first is the medical factor which bases com-
mitment solely on the necessity for treatment of the indi-
vidual, and has as its objective speedy commitment with a
minimum of "red tape" so that treatment can be begun at
the earliest possible stage of the illness. The second factor
is the legal factor which bases commitment, in main, on
the necessity to protect the individual and/or society. The
legal factor helps safeguard the individual's personal and
property rights as well as prevent "railroading". The vary-
ing degrees of influence asserted by the legal and medical
factors in any commitment procedure would seem to ex-
plain the lack of uniformity in commitment procedure from
state to state.
There are two general classifications of commitment
procedure used in the United States. The first, judicial
commitment, used in the majority of the states, requires a
formal court proceeding to determine a person's mental
condition in order to commit him to a mental institution.
The second classification of commitment procedure is the
ex parte commitment, used by thirteen states and Mary-
land,9 which permits an indeterminate commitment with-
out a judicial hearing. The commitment order is issued
by a physician, public official, public health officer, relative
etc., and a judicial hearing is held only if the patient
The term "commitment" seems rather a bad choice of terms because of
the defintte connotation of criminality. However, since the Maryland statute
continues to use the term and since it is still in vogue in other medico-
legal writings the author will continue to use the term.
82 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 16, § 144, under which an equity court may
confine a person previously adjudicated "non compos menti8" upon the
application of a court appointed trustee, will not be discussed in detail.
05 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 1.
5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 32.
8 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 37.
0 Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57
Mich. L. Rev. 945, 967 (1959).
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appeals the order. It is to be noted that in the judicial
commitment procedure the person's civil and property
rights are amply protected since he has a full judicial hear-
ing prior to commitment. In most states where it is used,
formal adjudication of insanity accompanies a judicial com-
mitment. However in most of the states using the ex parte
procedure, including Maryland, the patient is not con-
sidered legally incompetent as a result of this commit-
ment.
A great deal of criticism has been leveled at both the
judicial and the ex parte commitment procedure. Among
the criticisms of the judicial commitment are:
1) The traumatic effects of a judicial trial, where the
patient hears friends or relatives testifying as to why
he should be "put away."
2) The delays and loss of time involved in judicial pro-
ceedings.
3) The public record of the commitment proceeding.
4) The reluctance of the patient and relatives to expose
to a jury the "public shame" of insanity.
Because of these factors it is felt by many writers that the
judicial commitment has the effect of inducing public
reluctance to seek psychiatric advice at the early stages of
mental illness when the possibilities of effective treatment
are the greatest.?° The proponents" of the judicial com-
mitment procedure claim that the judicial proceeding is
the only way to adequately safeguard the rights of mental
patients.
The two main criticisms of the ex parte commitment
procedure as used in Maryland and thirteen other states
are that they are conducive to "railroading," and that they
are unconstitutional as violative of the Due Process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The former criticism loses
some of its impact when it is recalled that most mental
institutions are seriously overcrowded and are most re-
luctant to take a patient unless he is clearly in need of
treatment.
10 See Comment, Analysis of Legal and Medical Considerations in Com-
mitment of the Mentally Ill, 56 Yale L.3. 1178, 1182 (1947) ; Weihofen,
Commitment of Mental Patients - Proposals to Eliminate Some Unhappy
Features of Our Legal Procedure, 13 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 99, 105 (1941).
u- Hugh Alan Ross, one of the leading writers in the field of mental
commitments states, "My own conclusion is that the best results can be
achieved by improving the judicial hearing rather than discarding it."
57 Mich. L. Rev. 945, 974 (1959).
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The constitutional validity of ex parte commitments has
been questioned in a number of state and lower federal
courts, but has never been passed upon by the Supreme
Court. Probably the leading case holding ex parte com-
mitment procedures unconstitutional is State v. Mullinax.12
In that case, a writ of mandamus was sought to compel the
superintendent of a mental institution to admit a mentally
ill person as a patient. The superintendent had refused
admission on the grounds that the act whereunder the
patient was sought to be committed was unconstitutional
and void. The Act, Missouri Statutes Annotated, Section
202.797 (Vernon Supp. 1960) was similar to Maryland's
commitment procedure and provided for commitment on
application of a relative or friend and certification by two
doctors that the person was mentally ill. The act also
provided that if the patient or someone on his behalf re-
quested his release he must be released within 48 hours or
be granted a full judicial hearing. The Supreme Court of
Missouri, in holding the procedure violative of the Due
Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that:
"[F]or the statute... to thus deprive a person of his
liberty without an opportunity to be heard in advance
of commitment, if he or those acting for him desire it,
would constitute a denial of due process, and accord-
ingly render the statute, in its present form, unconsti-
tutional."''
It is to be noted that the constitutional objections to
the ex parte procedures do not mean that a state may not
temporarily restrain a person who is dangerous to himself
or others pending judicial hearing; the objection is that
a person is being committed, and thus deprived of his
liberty for an indefinite period (until there is some change
in his mental condition), without benefit of judicial hearing.
Courts reaching the opposite result, upholding its con-
stitutionality, 4 reason that commitment is based on pro-
tection, not punishment, and as long as adequate oppor-
'2364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W. 2d 72 (1954).
'AId., 77. See also Barry v. Hall, 98 F. 2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938) ; and In
re Maddox, 351 Mich. 358, 88 N.W. 2d 470 (1958).
1, See In re Bryant, 214 La. 573, 38 So. 2d 245 (1948) ; In re Crosswell,
28 R.I. 137, 66 A. 55 (1907) ; and of. In re Cornell, 111 Vt. 454, 18 A. 2d
304 (1941) which held that permanent commitments can be made only by
a court, but where the issue of mental illness is subsequently determined
by a court on post commitment request, due process is satisfied. See also
Note, Constitutionality of Nonjudicial Confinement, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 109
(1950-51).
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tunity to obtain judicial review is left open to the person
committed or someone on his behalf then due process is
satisfied. This is the view reached by the majority of
cases.'i
Even though the majority of courts uphold the con-
stitutionality of ex parte commitment procedures, such
procedures could be made the basis for a great deal of
abuse. Hugh Alan Ross has suggested that if ex parte
procedures be used, four additional safeguards should be
provided.
"1) The procedure should be used only for the state
hospitals, and preferably only after an initial period
of short-term observation commitment;
2) The patient should not be considered as legally in-
competent;
3) The patient should be informed of his right to ap-
peal, both by the examining physicians and by the
hospital;
4) The statute which establishes the appeal process
should be essentially the same as a well-drawn stat-
ute which governs initial judicial commitment."'16
To this list might also be added a clause stating that
the patient should be examined by hospital physicians as
soon after commitment as possible in order to protect
against mistakes in judgment by certifying physicians.
Commitment of the Indigent or Partially Indigent
5 Maryland Code (1957) Article 59, Section 1 provides:
"When any person is alleged to be a lunatic or
insane and without sufficient means to pay for his or
her maintenance at any asylum, and who has no rela-
tive or relatives or others legally chargeable with his
or her support, the county commissioners of the county
in which such person may reside, or the department
of welfare of the City of Baltimore (if such person
resides in the City of Baltimore) shall, upon the
written certificates of two qualified physicians made in
accordance with the provisions of Section 31, cause
Supra, n. 9, 978.
16 Supra, n. 9, 975.
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such person to be sent to a hospital or some other
place better suited to his or her condition, there to be
confined at the expense or partial expense of the
county or city. .. until he or she shall have recovered
and be discharged in due course of law * * *."
The section further provides for methods of obtaining a
judicial hearing if requested by the alleged lunatic, his
relatives or friends or the county commissioners.
The application of the county commissioner commit-
ment procedure has gone through a stormy stage of transi-
tion. As late as 1954 this method was the "Basic Commit-
ment Provision,"'1 7 and was used for commitment of in-
digents as well as those patients able to pay for their own
maintenance at an institution. In 1954 the Circuit Court for
Prince George's County, 8 ruled that the county commis-
sioner commitment procedure was "clearly intended to
apply to lunatic or insane paupers," and without proof that
a person was a pauper and unable to defray his own
expenses a person could not be committed under Section 1
of Article 59. This ruling, although it seems to have been
ignored for a number of years, appears to be codified in
5 Maryland Code (Cum. Supp. 1960) Article 59, Section 4
which provides that Section 1 is not applicable to persons
with sufficient income to pay their support or who have
others legally chargeable with their support.
One other recent development will probably decrease the
use of the Section 1 commitment. In June, 1960, the Com-
missioner of Mental Hygiene announced that this method
will no longer be the preferred method of commitment,
and questions of financial responsibility are to be treated
as separate questions which can be settled after the patient
has been admitted. Thus, although as late as 1959 the
county commissioner commitment was used for 54% of
the patients in state mental hospitals," it is expected that
in future years the use made of this method of commitment
will sharply decrease.
17 Maryland Department of Mental Hygiene, Current Procedure in Com-
pliance With Commitment Law8 to a Mental In8titution in the State of
Maryland, (1954) p. 12.
18In the Matter of the Habeas Corpus of Carston Charles Harms,
Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Daily Record, February 25,
1944 (Md. 1944).
19Statistics In commitment to mental hospitals in 1959 (the latest com-
pilations at the date of this writing) were obtained through the cooperation
of Kurt Gorwitz, Director of Statistics for the Department of Mental
Hygiene.
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Family Request Commitments
5 Maryland Code (1957) Article 59, Section 32 provides:
"Whenever any person is shown to be a lunatic
or insane by the certificates of two qualified physicians,
as provided in § 31 of this article, the superintendent,
... [of any mental institution in the state] .. .may
receive and retain such person as a patient upon the
written request of any member of his family, or near
relative or friend, or the person with whom he re-
sides, or an officer of any charitable institution or
agency; ......
This section goes on to provide for methods of obtainingjudicial review, and further states that the provisions
relating to "the payment of the expenses of maintaining
persons in state institutions shall be applicable to persons
entering such institutions under the provisions hereof."
The family request commitment is a relatively new
procedure and seems to have come into existence as the
result of the previously mentioned Circuit Court ruling
that the county commissioner commitment was applicable
only to indigents, thus leaving the old sheriff's jury proce-
dure (now abolished) as the only method of committing
non-indigents.0 The bill was passed in 1944 and, in the
Legislative Summary published March 11, 1944, the ex-
planation was simply that the bill was enacted in order to
clarify the law governing commitment of insane persons to
institutions in accordance with a recent court decision.2
When it was first enacted, despite the above-mentioned
lower court ruling, the family request admission was used
only as an "emergency commitment" where, because of a
holiday or other contingency, a county commissioner com-
mitment order could not be obtained. In 1954, the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene stated that Section 32 "makes it
possible for the hospital to legally hold and treat a patient,
in the event of an emergency, until such time as the
requirements of the basic commitment law, Section 1,
Article 59, can be complied with. '22
Fortunately this position has been abandoned and in
June of 1960 the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene an-
nounced that the family request procedure is the preferred
Supra, n. 18.
"See Health and Welfare Council of the Baltimore Area, Inc., Access to
the Mental Hospital, (1960) p. 26.
2 Supra, n. 17, 19.
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procedure and the county commissioner support order will
no longer be required before a patient is admitted. The
basis of this ruling as stated by Commissioner Tuerk is
that:
"hospitalization is always stressful for the patient and
family and it should not be made more so by police
custody, financial investigation prior to hospitalization,
and other procedures not always necessary... modern
concepts of psychiatric treatment place more emphasis
on the cooperation and participation of the family."
Since Section 32 is relatively clear and presents little
difficulty in its application, its construction has not been
passed upon by the Court of Appeals. The main question
as to its interpretation, concerning who should sign the
petition under the alteratives, seems to be adequately
answered by the Department of Mental Hygiene, in its
compilation of "Current Procedure" which states:
"These possible signers are listed in preferential order,
i.e. if a relative is available, a friend should not sign
the request. A policeman is not an officer of a chari-
table institution or agency. An agent of a welfare
agency does comply with the requirements of this law,
as does an officer of any hospital which has any
charity beds.""
In 1959 only 17% of the patients in state mental hos-
pitals were admitted under the Section 32 procedure ;24
however, in the light of the new announcement by the
Commissioner of Mental Hygiene it is expected that this
procedure will in the future be used for the great majority
of admissions.
The Doctor's Certificate
5 Maryland Code Article 59, Section 31 provides:
"No person shall be committed to or confined as a
patient in any institution ... for the care and custody
of the insane or idiotic except upon the written certifi-
cates of two qualified physicians 25 of the State of Mary-
Supra, n. 17, 19.
Supra, n. 19.
A licensed osteopath is not a "qualified physician" as defined in the
Mental Health Act, although a general practitioner clearly would be.
Palmer v. O'Hara, 359 Pa. 213, 58 A. 2d 574 (1948).
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land made within one week after separate examination
by them of said alleged lunatic and setting forth the
insanity or idiocy of such person and the reason for
such opinion. No certificate shall be of force which
shall be presented for the commitment of any patient
more than thirty days after date of examination."
The statutory form of the certificate further requires
that the signing physician have practiced for more than
five years, and not be connected in any way with the hos-
pital in which it is proposed to place the person examined.
The examining physician must state that he is of the
opinion that the person examined is "insane, and that the
disease is of a character which.., requires that the person
shall be placed in a hospital. .. ." There is a further provi-
sion that "this section shall not apply to the cases of vol-
untary commitments...."
This section probably presents more difficulties than
any other part of the commitment procedure. The first
area of difficulty, and one which perhaps can never be
completely clarified to everyone's satisfaction, centers
around the meaning of "insanity" as used in the certificate.
The legal test contemplated by the use of the word would
logically seem to be the same test used by a court in
determining whether a person is well enough to leave an
institution once committed, viz., would the person because
of his illness if unconfined be a danger to himself or to
the safety or property of others. In a fairly recent case,
the Maryland Court of Appeals, although not directly deal-
ing with the legal test for commitment, stated the general
rule:
"Most jurisdictions have statutes authorizing the
commitment and detention of the insane in institutions.
Under the statutes, as generally interpreted (whether
explicit in this regard or not) the right to confine or
keep confined an insane individual depends upon
whether or not the person, if free, will probably imperil
his own safety or the safety and property of others."2 6
Thus the legal test in commitment seems to be the
common law test of danger to self or others; however, like
many legal tests its application in specific situations is
often very difficult. Since the physician is the person who
must make the initial determination of sanity under our
1 Salinger v. Superintendent, 206 Md. 623, 630, 112 A. 2d 907, (1955).
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ex parte procedures the author has made a survey of a
number of general practitioners in order to find out how
the certification works out in actual practice. One of the
interesting facts uncovered is that about twenty five to
thirty percent of the general practitioners refuse to sign
commitment certificates (of this percentage a few indicated
that they might be willing to sign if the other certifying
physician was a qualified psychiatrist). As to the actual
tests used by doctors in forming their opinions, the indi-
vidual's environment and type of care he could receive at
home plays a very important part in the decision as to
whether the certificate as to insanity will be signed. If a
test could be stated, it would seem to be: all factors con-
sidered (including the illness, home environment, and
treatment needed) would this individual be better off in an
institution. Thus the doctor is looking primarily toward
what is best for this individual, whereas the legal test
also looks at safety and protection of others." If any line
can be drawn between the "committable" mentally dis-
ordered person and the person who is merely maladjusted,
it would seem to be between the psychotic (the individual
who has had a break or withdrawal from reality) and the
neurotic (the individual who has had no break from
reality but is the victim of inner conflicts which might be
evidenced by anxiety, obsessions, compulsions or hysteri-
cal symptoms). Most doctors interviewed would consider
committing the psychotic but would not consider com-
mitting the neurotic since a neurotic is not usually classed
as "insane". Even with severe neurotic disorders such as
anorexia nervosa (a loss of appetite so severe it threatens
life) most doctors indicate that they would not certify the
patient as insane but would instead have him treated at a
general hospital.
Another question which arises with reference to the
doctor's certificate is who is the actual committing agent.
Under the county commissioner commitments previously
discussed, the requisites are two doctors' certificates and
an order of the county commissioner or the Department of
Welfare of Baltimore City, and under the family request
I" One psychiatrist has indicated that the doctor is therapy oriented and
as such his prime motivation is to benefit the patient. However, when he
signs a commitment certificate he is in effect deciding what is best for
the community knowing that the patient's welfare may only be a secondary
consideration. This conflict of roles may be part of the cause of the
widespread hesitancy among the medical profession to commit mental
patients. Szasz, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, Treatment or social
Restraint, 125 Jour. Nervous and Mental Diseases, 293, 305 (1957).
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procedure the requisites are two doctors' certificates and a
petition by a relative, friend, etc. There seems a split of
authority on the question of who is the actual committing
agent. There is some indication from the language used by
the Court of Appeals that perhaps the doctor is the com-
mitting agent; 28 however, it was merely a choice of lan-
guage to describe commitment and not the question before
the Court. It would seem that under the procedure in
Maryland the physician acts as a mere witness giving his
opinion, not as the committing agent. The physician does
not institute the procedure, he is merely asked by someone
else to make an examination. The county commissioners,
friends, relatives, etc. are not bound to commit merely
because two doctors have certified that the person is insane.
Further, if one or more doctors are of the opinion that the
person is sane, the relative, etc., is allowed to "shop around"
for two doctors having different opinions. The Committee
on Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill of the Health and
Welfare Council of the Baltimore Area, Inc., in an excellent
publication entitled Access to the Mental Hospital, deter-
mined from their study of Maryland procedure that the
doctor was not the committing agent and further stated:
"The clarification stated in this report as to the
legal responsibility incurred by the physician when he
signs a certificate - that this is an advisory act, not
an act of commitment - is expected to remove one of
the barriers to a fuller participation by the family
physician in helping the family to find a solution to
their problem. '29
There are several reasons why it is important to clarify
the fact that the physician is not the actual committing
agent. First, a patient is not very likely to respond to
treatment by physicians when he knows that two phy-
sicians were legally responsible for his commitment, since
a deranged person might well construe this as a conspiracy
I In Lutz v. Superintendent, 203 Md. 675, 100 A. 2d 732 (1953) the court
said petitioner was committed "on the medical certificates of two doctors"
under then Art. 59, §§ 1, 20, 30 of the 1951 Code. Also in Ramberg v.
Superintendent, 217 Md. 652, 141 A. 2d 752 (1958) the court in describing
petitioner's commitment said "he was committed on certificate of two
doctors, and is now being detained under Code (1957) Art. 59, § 31." See
also 14 Ops. Att'y. Gen. (Md. 1929) 180, 181 where the Attorney General
said "It [the doctor's certificate] is in effect an adjudicative certification of
the necessity of confining the patient which serves as the legal warrant to
the institution to detain him."
2 Supra, n. 21, 45. See also Szasz, Civil Libertie8 and the Mentally II,
9 Clev. Mar. L. Rev. 399, 402 (1960).
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by physicians against him. Secondly, if physicians are
aware that they are not the actual committing agents they
might be more willing to sign a commitment certificate
which they would otherwise refuse because of moral com-
punctions against becoming legally responsible for de-
priving another person of his liberty.
However, the mere fact that a doctor is not the com-
mitting agent will not absolve him from responsibility
for a wrongful or false certification. Physicians in signing
a commitment certificate are not acting as quasi judicial
officers, and hence they are not accorded judicial immunity
for their wrongful acts. Nor are physicians in signing the
certificate acting as witnesses in a judicial proceeding and
thus they are not immune from liability on that ground.30
Liability would seem to be predicated on the fact that
the physician knows that his certificate will be an instru-
ment used in causing another to be deprived of his liberty.
Where a person committed to a mental institution brings
a false imprisonment action against a certifying physician
because of failure to comply with proper commitment
procedures, the doctor usually tries to justify detention on
the basis of the common law rule that any person can
detain a mentally ill person who constitutes a danger to
himself or others. There is some conflict among the
decisions as to whether statutory commitment procedures
replace or merely supplement the common law rule. In
Orvis v. Brickman,3 1 the court held that the common law
rule was a good defense to a false imprisonment action
even though proper commitment procedures were not fol-
lowed.
Maryland has never specifically passed on the question
of whether the common law rule is replaced by our com-
mitment statutes; however, the case of Miller v. West "
seems to indicate that the common law rule is still in force
in Maryland and therefore the only time a certifying
physician could be liable is when the committed patient
was in fact sane and the doctor was negligent or did not
make an examination. In the West case, a patient released
after nine months confinement brought suit against the
two certifying physicians on the grounds that their cer-
tifications as to his insanity were improperly and falsely
made without proper examination. The court indicated
a*Rice v. Gray, 225 Mo. App. 890. 34 S.W. 2d 567 (1930).
196 F. 2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See also Warner v. State, 297 N.Y.
395, 79 N.E. 2d 459 (1948).
165 Md. 245, 167 A. 696 (1933).
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that a cause of action might exist by one who, by reason
of the physicians' improper certification of insanity, was
wrongfully confined in a mental hospital; however, the
court sustained the defendants' demurrers on the grounds
that mere allegations of falsity in the certificate and
wrong in the confinement were too general and ambiguous.
The court further stated:
"But the action, if it lies, can be resorted to only
for redress of injury from the physicians' having con-
tributed to bring about confinement of one who should
not have been confined. If the patient was in fact
insane, and in need of the confinement, there would
be no actionable injury from wrongful procedure in
confining him. '3
Voluntary Admissions
Voluntary admissions are probably the least contro-
versial and most uniform method of gaining access to a
mental hospital. However, it is to be noted that only a
relatively small percentage of the mentally ill are capable
of the volition required for a voluntary admission. In addi-
tion, few of these recognize their condition. 4 Only two
states exclude voluntary patients unless formally com-
mitted. 5 One state has held its voluntary commitment law
unconstitutional as a violation of due process on the ground
that a mental patient could not have the capacity to make
application for hospitalization. However, this result has
been severely criticized.37
The Maryland statute8 provides that the superin-
tendent of a mental hospital may accept a patient for care
and treatment whenever the individual applies for such
treatment in writing. No person voluntarily admitted can
be held longer than three days after his request to leave
unless in the meantime he has been legally committed
by one of the previously discussed methods. Further as-
surance that the admission is truly voluntary is provided
by the act in that no person is to be committed whose
-Id., 248.
"Curran, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 31 N.C. L. Rev. 274, 278
(1953).
"9 ALA. CODE (1940) Title 45, § 204, and 14A FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943)
Title 27, § 394.25. Editor's note: See LINDMAN & MCINTYRE (EDS.), THE
MENTALLY DIS ALED AND THE LAW (1961), published after this article was
written.
Ex parte Romero, 51 N.M. 201, 181 P. 2d 811 (1947).
'"Ross, Hospitalization of the Voluntary Mental Patient, 53 Mich. L.
Rev. 353, 354 (1955). See also Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law,
p. 81 (1953). See LiNDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra, n. 35.
85 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 37.
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mental condition is such that he does not understand the
significance of his action and his rights in requesting dis-
charge, and no commitment is to be continued under the
provisions of the act when the mental condition of the
patient becomes such that he is not competent to give
continuous assent to his detention. Finally there is a pro-
vision that the act must be read or exhibited to every
person requesting admission to any institution as a volun-
tary mental patient.8 9
In 1959 voluntary patients accounted for ten percent of
the population of Maryland's state mental hospitals.40
With the growing realization by the general public of the
modern concept of mental sickness as a disease similar to
physical illness and the growing willingness of the average
citizen to undergo psychiatric treatment, an increase in
voluntary admissions may be expected.
One other factor in voluntary admissions deserves men-
tion. Although the act does not require a doctor's certificate
to accompany a voluntary patient, the Department of
Mental Hygiene usually requires an endorsement by one
physician that the person "is in need of treatment at an
institution for mental disorders."4 This adminstrative re-
quirement seems reasonable in the light of the over-
crowded conditions in mental hospitals, and any voluntary
patient truly in need of treatment should have no difficulty
obtaining the required endorsement.
CRIMINAL COMMITMENTS
42
In this section no attempt will be made to analyze in
detail all the statutory sections relating to the insane
defendant; rather, the analysis will deal in main with the
procedure and tests used for insanity at the different stages
8 This last provision Is an Important safeguard In the light of a
Connecticut holding that a voluntary mental patient does not have to be
told by the hospital authorities of his right to obtain release by written
request even though they are aware of his desire to leave. Roberts v.
Paine, 124 Conn. 170, 199 A. 112 (1938). See editor's note: LINDMAN &
MCINTYRE, supra, n. 35.
40 Statistics in commitment to mental hospitals in 1959 (the lastest
compilations at the date of this writing) were obtained through the
cooperation of Kurt Gorwitz, Director of Statistics for the Department of
Mental Hygiene.
"Maryland Department of Mental Hygiene, Current Procedure in Com-
VZiance with Commitment LaW8 to a Mental Institution in the State of
Maryland, (1954) p. 55.
"The term criminal commitments Is actually a misnomer but it is used
by the author for brevity and means any court commitment to a mental
institution arising from the fact that the patient was formally accused of
a crime.
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of criminal proceedings. Today in Maryland there are three
separate legal tests of insanity to be applied to a criminal
defendant. The first of these is whether the accused is
"sane" enough to stand trial, the second is whether or not
the accused was "insane" at the time of the criminal act
and therefore not responsible for his actions, and the third
test is whether, the accused, having been found to have
been "insane" at the time of the alleged act, is still "insane".
Is The Accused Sane Enough To Stand Trial?-
A Determination Of Insanity For The Trial Court
At common law an insane person unable to conduct or
advise in his defense could not be subjected to a trial in a
criminal case.4" The issue of insanity at the time of trial
was to be determined before another step was taken,
whenever inability to stand trial became apparent from
observation or whenever the issue was raised." Whether
or not the accused was "sane" at the time of trial was
decided by the trial court in its discretion.45 The rationale
behind this rule has been aptly stated by the Maryland
court in Price v. State:
"If, however, the party be found insane at the time of
the trial so as to incapacitate him, the law, out of ajust and compassionate consideration for his condition,
will not try him of the crime charged . . ., but will
stay the charge and await such time when his reason
shall be sufficiently restored, so as not to prevent him
from properly conducting or advising as to the con-
duct of his defence, although he may have been of
sound mind at the time the alleged crime was com-
mitted. The reason for this rests upon weighty con-
siderations, for who knows better than the party
charged the facts and the witnesses that may establish
his innocence, and these may be his solitary and in-
communicable possession by force of his mental con-
dition. '14 6
The test and procedures used for determining whether
the accused is sane enough to stand trial are set out in the
Maryland statute which provides that:
-3 A.L.R. 94 (1919); Ashley v. Pescor, 147 F. 2d 318, 319 (8th Cir.
1945).
"23 C.J.S. 232, Criminal Law, § 940.
48 Slough and Wilson, Mental Capacity to Stand Trial, 21 U. of Pitts. L.
Rev. 593 (1960).
159 Md. 491, 499, 151 A. 409, (1930).
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"Whenever any person charged with the commis-
sion of any crime, offense, or misdemeanor shall ap-
pear to the court or be alleged to be a lunatic or
insane or if the court shall have any reason to suspect
that such person may be a lunatic or insane the court
may cause the Department of Mental Hygiene to in-
quire whether such person is at the time of such in-
quiry insane or lunatic, or of such mental incapacity
as to prevent such person from properly conducting
his or her defense or advising as to the conduct of
his or her defense; and if the Department of Mental
Hygiene shall find that such person is at the time of
such inquiry insane or lunatic or of such mental in-
capacity as to prevent such person from properly con-
ducting his or her defense or advising as to the conduct
of his or her defense, the court shall in its discretion
direct such person to be confined . .. [in a mental
institution] .. .until he or she shall have recovered
and shall stay the proceedings against such person
until that time, and upon recovery the court shall
proceed with the trial of the charge pending against
such person.'47
Thus, the common law rule is codified with some modi-
fication. Although the court still makes the final deter-
mination as to whether or not the accused is sane enough
to stand trial, the Department of Mental Hygiene acts as
an advisory body. Seemingly this determination is also
made at any stage of the proceeding where the accused's
incapacity to stand trial is questioned or suspected by the
trial court. There seems, however, to be some question as
to whether the determination of insanity by the Depart-
ment of Mental Hygiene, although admittedly only ad-
visory, is necessary in order for the judge to commit the
defendant to an institution under this section. In In the
Matter of the Habeas Corpus of Carston Charles Harms,48
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, held invalid
a commitment by the court under Maryland Code (1939)
Article 59, Section 8 (now 5 Maryland Code (1957) Article
59, Section 9) after examination and certification by two
physicians not members of the Department of Mental
4' 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 9. Emphasis added. Section 11 of the same
articles provides for observation and treatment of a prisoner who has
been committed to jail in default of bail to await further proceedings and
can result in a commitment in accordance with § 9.
48 Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Daily Record, February 23,
1944 (Md. 1944).
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Hygiene. The Court was of the opinion that in order for
a commitment to be valid under this section there had to
be an "inquisition" and some deliberative finding by the
Department of Mental Hygiene upon which the Court
should take action. It is important to note that although
the determination of insanity by the Department of Mental
Hygiene may be necessary in order to commit the accused
under the statute, the judge is not required to request a
finding by the Department of Mental Hygiene in order to
rule the defendant sane enough to proceed with the trial
even though incapacity to stand trial is pleaded.4 9
The Maryland test of incapacity to stand trial, viz.,
whether the defendant is "of such mental incapacity as
to prevent [him] from properly conducting his ... defense
or advising as to the conduct of his . . .defense,"50 is an
extremely strict test of mental disease,51 as are most of
the tests for incapacity to stand trial. To be so "insane" as
to be unable to stand trial the defendant would probably
have to be clearly psychotic. The psychopathic defendant
is capable of standing trial.52 Thus it would appear that a
defendant could be "insane" under one or more tests for
insanity yet still be sane enough to be able to assist in the
conduct of his defense. Further, since the finding of in-
capacity to stand trial is one to be made by the trial court
in its sound discretion the chances of reversal appear to
be unlikely.
Is The Defendant Not Guilty By Reason Of
Insanity And Insane Now?-
Determinations Of Sanity For The Trier Of Fact
The first issue of sanity for the jury is whether the
defendant was insane at the time of commission of the
criminal act and therefore not guilty by reason of insanity.
Even though the defense of insanity is specially pleaded,
if there is no specific reference to sanity in the verdict of
the trier of fact it is conclusively presumed that the finding
"Hamilton v. State, 225 Md. 302, 170 A. 2d 192 (1961) ; State v. Hazel,
Criminal Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, December 6, 1960 (Md.
1960). See also Hereden v. U.S. 286 F. 2d 526 (10th Cir. 1961).
'0 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 9.
"It seems to be a harsher test of mental disease than that applied by
the federal courts viz., whether he has sufficient present ability to consult
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the pro-
ceedings against him. See Dusky v. United States, 271 F. 2d 385 (1959),
rev'd 362 U.S. 402 (1959).
5 U.S. v. Jones, 147 F. Supp. 265 (D.C. Md. 1956).
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was made that the defendant was sane at the time of the
commission of the act. In Maryland the test used to de-
termine insanity sufficient to relieve the defendant of
criminal responsibility is the M'Naughten rule,53 as stated
in Spencer v. State (referred to locally as the Spencer
Test) :
"if at the time of the commission of the alleged offense,
he had capacity and reason sufficient to enable him to
distinguish between right and wrong, and understand
the nature and consequences of his act, as applied to
himself, he is a responsible agent."54
This test of insanity used in determining whether a
person is responsible for his otherwise criminal acts is
probably the strictest of all tests for insanity. A person
could conceivably be insane under the civil test (danger
to self or others), be too insane to stand trial (unable to
conduct or assist in the conduct of his defense) and yet
be able to distinguish between right and wrong and know
the nature and consequences of his acts under the Spencer
test. It is to be noted that the Spencer test, although used
to determine sanity at the time of commission of the of-
fense, cannot really be called a test of insanity. It is sim-
ply a test of responsibility for a given act. Insanity is a
condition, almost a status at law. The Spencer test does
not determine a patient's over-all mental condition; in-
stead, it looks at a person's mental condition over a very
short period (time of the act) and only in relation to
specific acts, the person's over-all mental history and
mental condition being important only in drawing infer-
ences as to his mental condition at the time of the act.
If the accused was, in fact, "insane" at the time of the
act, the trier of fact must now make a determination as to
his sanity at the time of the trial. If the defendant is found
by the trier of fact to be insane at the time of commission
of the act but sane at the time of trial he leaves the court
room a free man. If, however, he is found insane at the
time of commission of the act and insane at the time of
- 10 Cl. & F. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
"[T]o establish a defense ... of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the
mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing;
or if he did not know it, that he did not know that he was doing
what was wrong."
-69 Md. 28, 87, 13 A. 809 (1888). For a discussion of the burden of
proof of insanity at the time of the act see 15 Md. L. Rev. 157 (1955).
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trial, the court is required to commit the defendant to a
mental institution until he recovers his sanity. 5
There seems to be some question as to the result of a
verdict of "sane" at the time of commission of the act but
"insane" at the time of trial. Under Section 8,56 the judge
is empowered to commit a defendant found not guilty by
reason of insanity and "insane" at trial. There is no
authority given under this section to commit to a mental
institution a defendant found guilty of the crime. Nor
would this seem to be a determination of incapacity to
stand trial, for that is a question for the trial court made
upon the advice of the Department of Mental Hygiene. It
would seem that when a verdict of guilty but "insane" at
time of trial is brought in by the jury, the judge would
have two alternatives: either to grant a new trial and if he
thinks it necessary to compel an examination of the de-
fendant by the Department of Mental Hygiene and, upon
its recommendation, commit the defendant until he be-
comes sane enough to stand trial, or, if the judge is still
of the opinion that the defendant was sane enough to
stand trial, he seemingly could sentence the defendant upon
the jury's verdict of guilty and leave it to the Board of
Correction to hospitalize the defendant under its power to
commit insane convicts to mental institutions.57
Once the jury has determined that the defendant was
"insane" at the time of the act, it then has to determine
whether or not he is "insane" at the time of trial, and
therefore whether he should be committed to a mental
institution. The test for this "insanity now" is not speci-
fied in the Code (nor is the test for criminal responsibility)
and the Court of Appeals has never specifically stated the
test for the jury determination of insanity at the time of
trial (or "insanity now").
Probably the best way to determine the test for "in-
sanity now" is by a process of elimination - by first
determining what the test cannot be. As was previously
noted, the test for the jury's verdict of "insane now" does
not seem to be that the accused lacks sufficient mental
capacity to conduct or assist in conducting his own defense,
since this is a collateral determination to be made by the
judge upon the recommendation of the Department of
Mental Hygiene. Also, it would seem both unjust and
'5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 8.
Ibid.
5 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 43. See also 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27.
§ 711.
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illogical to submit to the jury along with the questions of
guilt the further question of whether the defendant can
legally be tried after he has in fact been tried. At least
one state has ruled that submitting to the jury the question
of a person's competency to stand trial, along with the
question of his guilt or innocence, constitutes reversible
error." Thus, since the jury question of "insanity now"
does not seem to be capacity to stand trial, the next possi-
bility is that the test for "insanity now" is the same as the
Spencer test for criminal responsibility viz., that the de-
fendant cannot distinguish between right and wrong and
does not know the nature and consequences of his acts. 9
It is doubtful whether this is the test used for "insanity
now". As was indicated previously, the Spencer test is not
a medical test for insanity, it is a test for criminal responsi-
bility for a given act or acts. Efforts to rework the Spencer
test into a test for continuing insanity would be extremely
difficult and would present the jury with an almost im-
possible yardstick for insanity. Would the defendant have
to have no present conception of right and wrong, or would
a hazy conception of right or wrong still render him insane?
Would appreciation of the nature and consequences of just
some but not all of his actions render him insane, and if so
which ones, or does the defendant have to be totally
oblivious of the nature and consequences of all of his
actions in order to be found "insane now", a result which
would make a finding of "insanity now" a rare phenomenon
since a person so severely mentally ill would probably
never be tried. Thus, the one remaining test for "insanity
now" would be the same test as that used for civil commit-
ments viz., whether the person by virtue of his mental
condition would, if a free agent, constitute a danger to
himself and/or the safety or property of others. This test
seems to be the test for "insanity now" not only by a
process of elimination but also for logical and practical
reasons.
In Wagner v. M. & C.C. of Baltimore0 Wagner was
found by the jury not guilty by reason of insanity and
"insane now." He was committed to a state hospital for
the insane and a trustee was appointed by the court. It
was ordered that the trustee pay out of Wagner's estate,
a specified sum for Wagner's support and maintenance at
the hospital under what is now 5 Maryland Code (1957)
18 State v. Charles, 124 La. 744, 50 So. 699 (1909).
Supra, n. 54, 37.
® 134 Md. 305, 106 A. 753 (1919).
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Article 59, Section 13. The trustee objected to the payment
on the ground that a person confined because of a criminal
offense should not have to pay for his own support. The
Court of Appeals in affirming the support order stated:
"When his insanity was established by the verdict of
the jury, he was no more a criminal than if he had
never been charged with a crime, and he was in
precisely the same situation as one who had, upon his
own application or upon the application of others been
adjudged insane." 61
Thus it would appear that if a person committed upon a
jury verdict of "insane now" is in the same situation, and
is to be treated the same as a person committed by civil
procedures, the test for the two types of commitments
should also be the same.
The case of Salinger v. Superintendent62 also might be
an indication that danger to self or others is the test for
"insane now", although the court made no determination
on this point. In the Salinger case the petitioner was found
by a jury to be not guilty by reason of insanity and "insane
now," and was committed to Spring Grove. Four years
after his commitment petitioner brought a proceeding
to obtain his release on the ground that he had regained
his sanity. In the second proceeding a jury found petitioner
still insane under an instruction to the effect that even if
petitioner could distinguish right from wrong and knew
the nature and consequences of his acts he was still insane
if, he would be a danger to himself or the safety or prop-
erty of others. The Court of Appeals upheld the instruc-
tion and held that the test for release of a person found not
guilty by reason of insanity and "insane now" is the same
test used for release of a person committed by civil pro-
cedures, viz., danger to self or others. The court in the
Salinger case stated:
"One found to have been and to be insane in a criminal
proceeding, is committed not because he did the act
which caused him to be brought into court, but because
it is not safe for him or the community for him to be
at large. The confinement is not punishment, it is
custodial. The acts which preceded it merely served
Id., 309.
S206 Md. 623, 112 A. 2d 907 (1955), noted in 15 Md. L. Rev. 255 (1955).
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to bring about a judicial determination in a particular
form of the need for custodial confinement." 68
In an address given before the Judicial Conference of
the Maryland Judiciary on January 22, 1960, it was stated
that:
"Where the issue is release from or commitment to
a mental institution, the Salinger Case64 tells us that
'insanity' means that the individual, if he becomes a
free agent, will be a danger to himself and/or others.
It is this same meaning, I believe, that the jury
should have in mind, and it should be so instructed by
the court as the test of 'insane now', when a plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity is introduced under
section 765 of the code.""6
The question then arises as to the validity of having one
test for criminal responsibility and another still broader
test to determine whether the person, found not guilty by
reason of insanity, should be committed to a mental in-
stitution. The validity of this procedure is now certain.
Many states have statutes providing for compulsory com-
mitment to mental hospitals for varying periods where
there has been a finding of not guilty by reason of in-
sanity, and such statutes have been held constitutional even
though the defendant is committed, regardless of his
present mental condition.6 7  In Michigan and Massachu-
setts, persons acquitted of murder (or of manslaughter in
Massachusetts) by reason of insanity are automatically
committed to mental institutions for life, subject to dis-
charge by the governor on a finding that such discharge
would not be dangerous6 ' In North Carolina persons
acquitted of capital crimes because of insanity at the time
of the act are committed for life and can only be released
by a special act of the legislature; those acquitted of a
lesser crime can be released only by the governor 9.6  Thus
Id., 628. Emphasis added.
Supra, n. 62.
5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 7.
Address by Prof. L. Whiting Farinholt, Jr. of University of Maryland
School of Law.
1 Ex parte Boyd, 108 Cal. App. 541, 291 P. 845 (1930) ; People v. Dubina,
304 Mich. 363, 8 N.W. 2d 99 (1943). Editor's note: See also LINDMAN &
MCINTYRE, supra, n. 35.03 MICH. ComP. LAWS, § 766.15(c) (1948); 4 MASs. LAWs ANN. ch. 123,
§ 101 (1957).
10 3B N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 22, § 122-86 (1952). For a discussion of these
procedures see Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted by
Reason of Insanity, 38 Texas L. Rev. 849 (1960).
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it would seem that a more general and more inclusive
standard than that provided in the Spencer "right-wrong"
test should be applied in finding a person "insane now,"
and, if the author's interpretation is correct, an individual
found not guilty by reason of insanity will not leave the
court room a free man unless the jury is convinced that
his mental condition will not make him a menace to him-
self or to the safety and/or property of others.
RELEASE
The procedures for obtaining release, or for obtaining a
judicial determination of the necessity for continued com-
mitment, are fully set out in the Code; therefore, only a
brief outline of these procedures need be presented in this
section. The test used in deciding whether a person should
be released from a mental institution, regardless of the
procedure used to commit him, is whether if a free agent
he would constitute a danger to himself and/or the safety
and property of others.7 0 The voluntary mental patient has
an absolute right to release within 3 days after he gives
notice of his desire or intention to leave, unless in the
meantime he is committed under some other procedure.
Further, where the friends or relatives of any patient are
maintaining him at private expenses in any mental in-
stitution they have an absolute right to remove him under
5 Maryland Code (Cum. Supp. 1960) Section 42 regardless
of his mental condition.
A person committed under Section 3271 (by petition of
a relative, friend, etc., and two doctors' certificates), or
anyone on his behalf, may request release and the request
must be complied with unless the superintendent feels
that the patient's mental condition requires further de-
tention, in which event the superintendent will petition the
court for a sanity hearing. Section 21 of Article 59 further
provides:
"Any person confined in a State or licensed private
institution... or anyone in his behalf, . . . may file a
petition in the law courts . . . requesting that the
person so confined be brought before said court for
the purpose of having the sanity of such person de-
termined .... If the court or jury... shall determine
that such person is insane or is suffering from a men-
" Supra, n. 62.
n 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 32.
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tal disease, the court shall order said person com-
mitted .. otherwise he shall be discharged. After a
person has had one hearing under the provisions of
this section, any further petition filed by him within
a period of one year from the date of the previous
hearing shall be accompanied by one or more affidavits
of a person or persons, other than himself or another
person confined in an institution or hospital, as afore-
said, showing the mental condition of the petitioner
at that time as compared with such condition at the
time of the last previous hearing. If, in the opinion
of the court, the affidavit(s) indicate a substantial
improvement in the petitioner's mental condition, the
case shall be heard ... ; otherwise the petition shall
be dismissed." 72
If the court, in a proceeding under this section, finds
that the petitioner is still insane and orders the petitioner
returned to the institution, this is a final determination of
a court of law in a civil suit from which an appeal may be
taken.75 In a proceeding under this section the court may
appoint counsel for the allegedly insane person and should
have the testimony reported by a court stenographer.7 4
The Code also provides that the hospital may discharge
any patient, not under criminal charge, who appears "quiet
and harmless" and would not be dangerous to himself or
others.75 Since most mental hospitals are overcrowded
the hospital would probably be very lenient in its dis-
charges, thus avoiding the necessity of a petition to the
courts in most cases, if the patient has in fact recovered.
The provisions for release of persons committed as the
result of criminal prosecutions are somewhat more com-
plex. The use of the writ of habeas corpus is almost
abolished as a method for redetermination of mental con-
dition. Where a person accused of a crime is committed
to a mental hospital "for observation and treatment before
trial," the method for getting a redetermination of his
mental condition is by petition to the law courts under
Article 59, Section 21, and not by habeas corpus. 76 There
72 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 21.
"8 Adams v. May, 196 Md. 152, 75 A. 2d 839 (1950).
71 Ibid.
5 MD. CODE (Cum. Supp. 1960) Art. 59, § 42.
" Robertson v. Superintendent, 198 Md. 666, 80 A. 2d 900 (1951).
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is, however, a provision in Article 59, Section 8 that where
a person found not guilty by reason of insanity and
"insane now" is committed to a mental institution, any
judge of the Circuit Court for the county (or Supreme
Bench of Baltimore City) where such person is detained
"may upon habeas corpus proceedings, make any order,
absolute or conditional, for the permanent or temporary
discharge of the person upon satisfactory proof of per-
manent or temporary recovery." 7 However, it is doubtful
whether an appeal is available for refusal to issue the
writ.7 A person committed under a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity but "insane now" is not "detained or
confined as a result of a prosecution for a criminal offense."
He was found "not guilty" and his confinement was
ordered because, if free, he would constitute a danger to
himself or others. Therefore it would seem that the re-
quirements for appellate jurisdiction over a denial of the
writ of habeas corpus are not met.79 Thus the best proce-
dure for obtaining a redetermination of sanity for criminal
defendants committed by court order is Section 21 of
Article 59, previously discussed.80 There is one additional
requirement for criminal releases. No matter what proce-
dure is used, approval must be obtained from "a judge of
the court in which such person's case was pending at the
time of the commitment, or in which such person was ac-
quitted by reason of insanity."'"
CONCLUSION
In general, the author feels that the Maryland commit-
ment and release procedures are adequate to fully safe-
guard the rights of the mental patient as well as provide
" 5 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 8.
78 See Miller v. Superintendent, 190 Md. 741, 60 A. 2d 189 (1947). How-
ever, it is Important to note that according to the court In this case Miller
was committed under (then) MD. CODE (1939) Art. 59, § 7 which Is the
commitment procedure where a defendant Is found not guilty by reason of
insanity and "insane now." This allows habeas corpus in a later petition
involving the same defendant, Miller v. Superintendent, 198 Md. 659, 80
A. 2d 898. The court intimates that Miller was actually committed prior
to verdict and not under the above cited section. Therefore, although there
seems to be no clear cut holding on this point, all indications are that a
denial of habeas corpus under this section Is not reviewable on appeal.
"4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 42, § 7 provides for appellate review of habeas
corpus only where "the petitioner Is detained or confined as the result of a
criminal offense or has been confined as a defective delinquent."
w Supra, circa n. 72.
615 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 59, § 14.
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swift medical treatment. The two main areas where im-
provement might be made would be some type of emer-
gency commitment procedure for those in need of imme-
diate treatment but who do not submit to examination at
the request of near relatives or friends,82 and possibly a
compulsory commitment for observation of all persons
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
8 In such cases, the practice has been to secure examination after such
person has been arrested on a criminal charge (usually breach of peace),
detained and examined while held at the police station or in jail. It is
felt that this experience is sometimes harmful to the person's treatment,
and that the procedure would be improved if provisions for arrest,
detention, and examination at a mental hospital could be substituted for
the procedure of arrest on criminal charge, detention, and examination
at the police station or in jail.
